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THE ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 
THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
The outlook for world growth 
The outlook for the economies of Scotland's trading 
partners continues to be bright. Recovery in the 
OECD area is gaining strength and growth of 2.6% 
is expected this year following a 1.2% rise in 1993. 
The English speaking economies are exhibiting the 
strongest recoveries due to the fact that these 
economies tended to overheat earlier and more 
severely than in Japan and Europe. At present, 
continental Europe is behind the US, UK, Canada 
and Australia in recovery but all countries have 
passed the trough of recession and are expected to 
perform strongly in 1995 and beyond. 
World GDP is estimated to have grown by 2V4-
2Vz% last year. This is significantly faster than in 
the OECD area reflecting strong performances in 
the Pacific Rim and Latin America. In Asia, GDP 
grew by circa 6WSb last year and growth of 7% is 
likely this year. In Central & South America, GDP 
grew by 5Vi% in 1993 but is expected to moderate 
this year to circa 4% pa. These regions have been 
little affected by the recessionary pressure facing 
the developed nations since 1990. 
The present weakness in the European and Japanese 
systems is responsible for the moderation in world 
trade last year. In volume terms, the OECD 
estimate that global trade grew by 3.3% last year 
following a 5% rise in 1992. Intra OECD trade 
collapsed and declined by xh% whilst OECD 
exports to other regions grew by 8.6%. Imports into 
the OECD grew by 7.4%. Although exports out of 
the OECD region are likely to remain strong this 
year and beyond, it is the recovery of intra OECD 
trade which provides the motor of recovery in the 
coming period. Faster OECD growth is expected to 
engender a growth in internal trade of 5% this year 
and 614% in 1995. Growth of imports from other 
regions is projected to accelerate in the coming 
period. 
The recently published Scottish input-output tables 
for 1989, suggest that 10.2% of Scottish output is 
placed in the rest of the UK whilst 7% is sold 
overseas. In the case of manufactures, 36% of 
output is destined for south of the Border whilst 
33.1% is exported overseas. The most recent SCDI 
estimates indicate that 58.7% of Scottish 
manufacturing exports are destined for the European 
Union with a further 7.6% due to the EFTA area. 
North America accounts for 13.3% and the Far East 
10.8%. 
The growth profile for Scotland's major trading 
partners is set out in Table 1. This sets out the 
protracted recession and weak recovery experienced 
by the UK in the 1990-1993 period. Continental 
Europe remained in recession, with output declining 
by 0.4%. The OECD estimate that the volumes of 
goods and services imported by the EU member 
states fell by 4'/4% last year as domestic demand 
fell by 1%%. EU private and public consumption 
stagnated growing by 0.1% and 0.2% respectively. 
Fixed investment declined by 5% with business 
investment declining by 10% and residential 
investment by 1%. The level of stocks contracted 
by circa Vi% of GDP. 
This weakness in domestic demand was partially 
offset by a %% growth in goods and services. 
Those countries, such as the UK, Italy, Spain, 
Sweden and Finland, whose currencies depreciated 
against the ECU post White Wednesday 
experienced a 7V4% increase in exports with 
particularly strong growth in shipments to non 
Europe OECD countries and the Pacific Rim. This 
is largely due to the continuing strength of the yen. 
Those countries whose currencies remained linked 
together and thus appreciated, saw exports decline 
by 4V4%. This is despite strong but less impressive 
exports to more buoyant non EU markets. The data 
suggests that intra EU trade slumped dramatically 
but that the depreciators gained share at the expense 
of the large continental economies. 
UK exports grew by 3.1% in 1993 which is less 
than the average of depreciating countries. UK 
domestic demand grew by Wi% largely inspired by 
a 2'/2% increase in consumers expenditure as UK 
investment and Government consumption remained 
weak. Placing this alongside the poor situation in 
key EU markets does not conjure up a backdrop 
against which an export oriented region such as 
Scotland was likely to thrive. With the exception of 
Electronics and Textiles, all Scottish manufacturing 
sectors are performing weakly relative to the UK in 
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recovery, if any recovery is evident. Fortunately, 
the outlook for this year and next is significantly 
better. OECD GDP is expected to grow by 2.6% 
this year and by 2.9% in 1995 with recovery 
becoming more firmly rooted in Europe. This year, 
EU growth is expected to be circa 2% accelerating 
to 2%% next year due to the presently loose stance 
of monetary policy. Domestic demand is expected 
to grow VA% in 1994 and 2.6% in 1995 as 
increasing consumer and business confidence 
engenders stronger expenditure trends. However, the 
mainspring of recovery in Europe is expected to be 
exports which are projected to grow by 5%% this 
year and by 7% in 1995. 
This investment-export led growth in Europe will 
engender faster growth in intra EU trade which is 
likely to pick up considerably from the 2nd half of 
1994 onwards. In 1994, we expect that the 
combined import volumes of EU countries will rise 
by 3% and by 6.1% in 1995. These volumes are 
likely to comprise a lower levels from non EC 
sources due largely to the displacement of US and 
Japanese imports by domestic production and higher 
levels of imports from EU partners. The former is 
due to a booming US domestic market which is 
sucking in imports, leaving little capacity with 
which to serve external markets whilst the latter 
reflects a reduction in Japanese competitiveness due 
to an appreciating yen. 
Thus, import volume growth due to intra EU trade 
is likely to be significantly faster than the projected 
rise in import volumes. It is our confident 
expectation that Scottish business is well placed to 
benefit within such an environment. Recent 
evidence suggests that UK productivity levels 
remain below that of Europe. However, in exporting 
sectors we estimate that Scottish manufacturers are 
extremely competitive in the EU context. Thus, 
when key UK and export markets recover from mid 
1994 on, we expect that the demand for Scottish 
traded goods will expand and that Scottish 
manufacturers will increasingly take advantage of 
these opportunities. 
The outlook for world inflation 
Table 2 sets out the recent and projected inflation 
performance in the G7 bloc, the EU and in 5 major 
economies. As pointed out in the last Commentary, 
the English speaking economies tended to overheat 
first and go into policy induced recession before 
continental Europe whose recessions were more due 
to rises in interest rates transmitted by German 
borrowing to finance the underestimated costs of re-
unification. At present, inflation rates have 
converged around a new low global rate of circa 
3%. 
We set out a variant of what has become known as 
the 'rosy scenario' in which most countries 
experience fast growth and low inflation in the 
forthcoming period. We analysed the likely trend in 
oil and commodity prices concluding that rising 
world output would raise demand and prices, 
particularly for metals and oil, and that this posed 
some threat to medium term price stability. In the 
short term, we suggested that sizeable output gaps 
and high unemployment would moderate 
inflationary pressure implying that margins and 
earnings growth would remain weak. Our broad 
conclusion was that policy would have to tighten in 
anticipation of inflationary pressure in 1996 and 
beyond when economies would be working close to 
potential and that stable inflation will continue to 
demand unspectacular growth and high 
unemployment.' 
We have no strong reason to change our basic 
analysis. The lag between changes in monetary 
policy and aggregate demand appears to vary both 
across countries and for a given country in different 
situations. It is likely to be of the order of 15-30 
months. This suggests that the period of declining 
nominal interest rates is drawing to a close. For 
those English speaking economies whose recoveries 
are well underway, the pressure on interest rates is 
already evident. In Japan and continental Europe, 
interest rate rises are a more distant prospect. 
The recent rise in long term bond prices gives some 
indication of where the inflationary risk is felt to be 
greatest. Long term rates are the average of 
expected future short term rates. If real returns, 
inflation or both are expected to increase across the 
long term then one might expect to see long rates 
increasing relative to short rates. In addition, long 
rates may rise because of increased uncertainty 
about the future course and conduct of macro policy 
stance or because the dynamic properties of an 
economy are not well understood following 
structural change. 
Long term rates began to rise in the US in October 
and elsewhere in January. Analysis by the OECD 
suggests that the general rise is best viewed as two 
consecutive phases. From January to March there 
was a generalised and well correlated rise in long 
yields. From that point on there has been regional 
divergence. In general the largest swings in long 
yields are evident in the English speaking 
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economies which are ahead in recovery and in 
Sweden which is experiencing fast export led 
growth on the basis of a 20% devaluation of the 
Krona in late 1992. Two things require explanation. 
First, why have the markets chosen to increase bond 
yields since the beginning of the year. Second, is 
there any consistent message in the differential 
effect visited upon the global markets. 
According to NIESR, the rise is long rates reflects 
both a re-assessment of inflationary risk and of 
likely real interest rates. Central to this view is the 
argument that the output gap has been significantly 
overstated by both the IMF and the OECD in the 
December 1993 Economic Outlook. The output gap 
is the difference between actual and potential GDP 
and is used in assessments of how quickly growth 
can develop without engendering inflationary 
overheating. It is usually expressed as a proportion 
of potential GDP. Potential GDP is extrapolated 
from the peak of the cycle by rolling forward peak 
output according to the actual GDP growth 
experienced over the previous cycle(s). There are 
various ways of doing this none of which are 
perfect, leading to varying estimates. Until recently 
these output gaps were thought to be extensive 
outside the USA. 
In 1993, the US outgap was estimated by both the 
IMF and OECD to be circa 3A%. In Japan, both 
place the gap at circa 4V5% whilst the assessments 
of the UK provide figures of 5V*-5Vt%. The 
estimates of the gaps evident in continental Europe 
diverge more substantially. The German gap is 
estimated by the IMF at 2%% whilst the OECD 
estimate is 0.6%. In France, the IMF predict a 4% 
gap compared with a 5'/2% estimate by the OECD 
whilst, in Italy, the gap is put at 3%% by the 
former and 4.1% by the latter. NIESR note that 
recent OECD projections imply that output gaps are 
significantly lower in both Europe and Japan. 
The recent OECD estimates use a further method of 
assessing trend output and imply that the output gap 
in Germany was zero last year and North America 
is less than 1%. In Japan, the gap is circa Vi% and 
about 2% in France and Italy. The UK has the 
biggest gap of 2l/z-3%. NIESR report that their in 
house assessment supports the view that the 
previous IMF and OECD estimates were 'optimistic' 
and argue that it is this revision of output gaps 
which is driving the upward trend in long rates. 
Uncertainty about the true level of the output gap 
and a growing belief that economies were closer to 
full capacity than previously supposed would affect 
both the inflation and real returns components of 
long bond yields. If output gaps are low, then the 
inflationary implications of present growth trends 
are understated. Indeed, even if the markets retain 
IMF and prior OECD estimates as their broad 
assessment, increased uncertainty about the mid 
point would similarly induce a risk premium in long 
yields. If output gaps estimates are lowered then 
present and projected fiscal deficits contain a 
greater structural element and a lower cyclical 
component which implies higher future interest 
rates than previously supposed. 
If revision of output gaps accounts for the general 
upwards trend in long rates, it is a short step to 
arguing that the pattern of revision reflects a 
rational re-assessment of the differing prospects for 
individual economies. NIESR concludes that better 
estimates this gap are required in order to inform 
evaluation of the fiscal stance and of macro policy 
and attempts no such exercise. An adjustment of the 
size of the output gap is only one factor. 
In general, the pattern of long rate movements 
seems to favour economies with a favourable and 
credible counter inflationary record. The upward 
swings are greater in the English speaking countries 
who engaged in unwarranted monetary and fiscal 
expansions in the late 1980s and in countries such 
as Sweden and the UK who experienced substantial 
currency depreciations in the period around White 
Wednesday. Although these countries are 
experiencing recovery there is little sign of short 
term inflationary pressure. What may be worrying 
the markets is the capacity of policy makers to 
choke off medium term inflationary potential by 
taking sufficient steps early enough to minimise 
cyclical fluctuations. Such assessments are likely to 
consider how much scope given politicians have to 
engage in pre-election booms and how seriously 
there commitment to long run price stability will 
fare along the electoral cycle. 
This is the worrying message for the Conservative 
government in the UK. The UK has one of the 
lowest debt to GDP ratios in the industrialised 
world and according to the OECD the UK public 
finances appear to be on "a sustainable medium 
term path" following the recent tax increases. There 
is presently a loose monetary policy over which 
politicians exercise considerable influence and a 
portmanteau of monetary, inflation and exchange 
rate targets. The UK output gap, although revised 
downwards remains high and there is little scope 
for arguing that this effect accounts for the whole 
of the long rate adjustment. Following the fiscal 
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binge prior to the 1992 election and the perceived 
failure to maintain parity with the DM it is apparent 
that a the revision in the extent of output gaps have 
concentrated the minds of the markets upon the 
credibility of policymakers and that the UK 
government has been found wanting. 
In addition, markets will take account of whether 
the economy in question is inherently inflation 
prone. In the context of the UK this involves 
separating out the issue of whether UK bargaining 
institutions are more likely to deliver greater 
upward pressure on settlements whatever the stance 
of policy. Irresponsible monetary policy may feed 
a wage price spiral but it is the institutional features 
of the system which determine the pace at which 
wages and prices are bid up. Markets looking at 
recent events may conclude that the UK is simply 
inflation prone and demand a higher risk premium. 
Again this would be an unflattering comment on 15 
years of Conservative labour market reform. It 
would also suggest the need for structural reform 
encompassing co-ordinated pay bargaining taking 
place within a structured national assessment. 
A popular interpretation of the UK swing in long 
rates and the recent rise in base rates is that the 
credibility the government seeks can only be 
restored by returning to the ERM and maintaining 
a clear exchange rate target as an visible external 
discipline. This may indeed be the view subscribed 
to by the markets. However, since the advent of the 
Bretton-Woods system the UK has maintained a 
high exchange rate as a prime objective of policy 
and has manipulated the real economy in order to 
maintain parity. A strong anti inflation culture did 
not arise in the UK. Perhaps before any rush to 
return to the rock of a formal exchange rate target, 
emphasis on policies to improve internal discipline 
might be appropriate. This would imply 
consideration of the reform of pay bargaining as 
outlined above and whether the UK central bank 
needs to be more free from direct political control. 
Due to the pessimistic view of the output gap, the 
NIESR projections of growth and inflation are less 
sanguine than the OECD estimates outlined above. 
NIESR projects a greater need for a general rise in 
short term interest rates and seem likely to be 
correct. However, in the period to 1995, we still 
expect to see fast UK, EU and world trade and 
output growth with few inflationary implications. 
The NIESR analysis suggests that, if low inflation 
is to be maintained then the output growth 
achievable in the latter part of the decade is likely 
to slower than either the IMF or OECD suggest and 
reinforces our conclusion that stable prices will 
continue to require modest growth and high 
unemployment. 
The outlook for world unemployment 
Table 3 sets out the trend in unemployment in the 
G7, European Union and in 5 major economies. 
Unemployment in the OECD area rose to 33Vi 
million in 1993 which represents 8.2% of the 
workforce. In 1993, the jobless rate has risen in 
Germany, France, the UK and Japan but declined in 
the USA and Italy. In the UK, the rise in 
unemployment last year was moderated by a sharp 
fall in labour market participation as the demand for 
labour weakened substantially. In the EU, 17Vi 
million people were unemployed last year which 
represents a rate of 11.3%. This compares 
unfavourably with averages of 6.8% in the USA 
and an artificially low 2Vi in Japan. 
This year OECD unemployment is expected to 
increase to 35.3 million or 8.5%. Unemployment in 
the Europe Union is projected to increase to 18.6 
million or 12%. OECD unemployment is projected 
to rise 2.6% despite net employment growth of 
0.8%. The bulk of the expected employment 
creation is due to the English speaking world. 
Employment in the EU is forecast to decline by a 
further V*% with only the UK, Holland and 
Denmark exhibiting expansion. Particularly sharp 
falls in employment are expected in Germany and 
Italy. 
Next year OECD unemployment is expected to fall 
to 34.7 million or %V*%. OECD employment is 
expected to grow by a little over 1%. Again, the 
fastest growth in jobs is projected in the English 
speaking economies although increases are evident 
across the whole industrialised world. The US 
economy is projected to slow to 3% growth next 
year but employment is projected to rise by 1.8%. 
In Japan, real growth of 2-2Vi% is expected to 
result in a 0.9% rise in jobs and a fall in 
unemployment to 2.8%. In Europe, GDP growth is 
likely to accelerate to 2%% engendering a 0.6% 
expansion in jobs. Unemployment is projected to 
fall back to 18.4 million or 11.9%. Within the 
union, the strongest performances in terms of job 
creation are expected in Ireland and the UK. 
Elsewhere growth tends to be more moderate 
reflecting the fact that the cycle on the Continent is 
behind that in the British Isles. However 
unemployment across the Union will fall next year 
but modestly. 
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The implications for unemployment and job 
creation of present growth forecasts are alarming. In 
Europe, it appears that GDP growth of circa 2Vi% 
is only sufficient to maintain employment. Indeed 
as productivity growth increases in the upswing the 
tradeoff nay become more adverse. Whilst the US 
is capable of generating fast net employment 
expansion, the prospects for the EU are poor. Fast 
technological change seems certain to wreak 
continuing havoc on jobs as productivity increases. 
In a dynamic sense this is to be welcomed as it 
ultimately creates greater incomes which provide 
new demand for goods, services and jobs, provided 
they are not imported. In Europe, unlike Japan and 
the US, the system seem capable of adjusting better 
to such change. Until Europeans learn new tricks, 
the outlook for the Unions jobless remains 
particularly poor. 
Prospects in key Scottish export markets 
We would not wish to amend the detailed 
assessment that is set out in the previous 
Commentary. We continue to project that the US 
will slow next year and that recovery will become 
more general across the continent. Our assessment 
remains that there is little short term inflationary 
threat but are now less sanguine about the growth 
prospects latter in the UK. If output gaps are 
narrower than previously supposed, then output is 
likely to require to be slowed more quickly and 
more severely. The prospects of a more significant 
global recession in the latter part of the decade 
seem greater. 
The strength of the YEN is set to slow Japanese 
exports and promote strong outward flows of 
investment capital. To the extent that this focuses 
on Europe as opposed to the US and Pacific Rim, 
this seems set to disproportionately benefit the UK. 
The slow growth in Japanese export volumes seems 
set to facilitate export growth from Europe to both 
the Pacific Rim and North America where domestic 
demand remains strong. We expect the YEN to 
appreciate further than entertained last quarter 
giving further grounds to our view that the second 
half of 1994 and whole of next year will provide a 
strong platform for export led growth. 
Quarterly Economic Commentary 9 
Table 1 || 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994(F) 
OECD 
NIESR 
Barclays 
1995(F) 
OECD 
NIESR 
Barclays 
Table 2 || 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994(F) 
OECD 
NIESR 
Barclays 
1995(F) 
OECD 
NIESR 
Barclays 
L 
Table 3 || 
' 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994(F) 
OECD 
NIESR 
Barclays 
1995(F) 
OECD 
NIESR 
Barclays 
G7 
3.3 
2.9 
3.2 
4.5 
3.2 
2.4 
0.8 
1.7 
1.4 
2.7 
2.4 
2.6 
2.9 
2.3 
3.0 
G7 
4.0 
2.6 
3.1 
3.2 
4.2 
4.3 
4.2 
3.3 
2.6 
2.0 
2.2 
2.3 
2.3 
2.8 
2.8 
G7 
7.4 
7.4 
7.0 
6.3 
5.8 
5.8 
6.6 
7.3 
7.3 
7.4 
n/a 
n/a 
7.1 
n/a 
n/a 
Real GDP Growth (% change pa) 
USA Japan EU 
3.2 
2.9 
3.1 
3.9 
2.5 
1.2 
-0.7 
2.6 
3.0 
4.0 
3.5 
3.4 
3.0 
2.3 
3.0 
5.0 
2.6 
4.1 
6.2 
4.7 
4.8 
4.3 
1.1 
0.1 
0.8 
1.0 
1.4 
2.7 
2.0 
3.2 
nflation (Private Consumptior 
USA Japan 
3.9 
3.1 
4.2 
4.2 
4.9 
5.1 
4.3 
3.3 
2.7 
2.1 
2.5 
2.7 
3.1 
3.9 
3.8 
2.2 
0.4 
0.2 
-0.1 
1.8 
2.6 
2.5 
2.1 
1.0 
0.3 
0.6 
1.0 
0.3 
0.7 
1.0 
2.5 
2.9 
2.9 
4.2 
3.5 
3.0 
1.5 
1.0 
-0.4 
1.9 
2.0 
2.0 
2.8 
2.2 
2.7 
Germany 
2.0 
2.3 
1.5 
3.7 
3.6 
5.7 
1.0 
2.1 
-1.2 
1.8 
1.5 
1.9 
2.6 
2.0 
2.7 
France 
1.9 
2.5 
2.3 
4.5 
4.3 
2.5 
0.7 
1.4 
-0.7 
1.8 
1.4 
1.6 
2.9 
2.5 
2.5 
Deflator change % pa) 
EU Germany France 
5.7 
3.7 
3.5 
3.7 
4.8 
4.6 
5.3 
4.5 
3.8 
3.1 
3.4 
3.0 
2.5 
3.1 
2.9 
1.8 
-0.6 
0.5 
1.3 
2.9 
2.7 
3.7 
4.7 
4.0 
3.1 
2.9 
2.8 
1.9 
1.8 
2.3 
Dhemployment Rates (National Definitions) 
USA Japan EU Germany 
7.2 
7.0 
6.2 
5.5 
5.3 
5.5 
6.7 
7.4 
6.8 
6.3 
6.3 
n/a 
5.8 
6.6 
n/a 
2.6 
2.8 
2.9 
2.5 
2.3 
2.1 
2.1 
2.2 
2.5 
2.9 
2.9 
n/a 
2.8 
3.1 
n/a 
11.1 
11.2 
10.9 
10.3 
9.3 
8.7 
9.2 
10.3 
11.3 
12.0 
n/a 
n/a 
11.9 
n/a 
n/a 
8.0 
7.7 
7.6 
7.6 
6.9 
6.2 
6.7 
7.7 
8.9 
10.0 
9.3 
n/a 
10.0 
9.4 
n/a 
5.7 
2.7 
3.2 
2.6 
3.4 
2.8 
3.2 
2.4 
2.1 
1.7 
17 
1.8 
1.4 
1.5 
2.0 
France 
10.3 
10.4 
10.5 
10.0 
9.4 
8.9 
9.5 
10.4 
11.7 
12.3 
12.3 
n/a 
12.2 
11.6 
n/a 
UK 
3.8 
4.3 
4.8 
5.0 
2.2 
0.4 
-2.2 
-0.6 
1.9 
2.8 
3.1 
3.0 
3.2 
2.9 
3.2 
UK 
5.3 
4.0 
4.3 
5.0 
5.9 
5.5 
7.4 
4.8 
3.5 
2.9 
3.0 
2.6 
2.9 
3.8 
3.5 
UK 
11.6 
11.7 
10.3 
8.2 
6.2 
5.9 
8.3 
10.0 
10.3 
9.6 
9.5 
n/a 
8.9 
8.7 
n/a 
